FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
Declares a foreground service as data-sync work, giving the mprivhaan payload a service that survives Doze while it uploads.
Granted automatically at install. FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC is the runtime type that makes a foreground service legitimate when its job is transferring data, and since Android 9 an app cannot start a foreground service without declaring the matching type.
In mprivhaan this is the type actually used. The analysis traces a persistent worker service with foregroundServiceType="dataSync" and exported false, which holds a foreground notification slot so it survives Doze and App Standby while it performs network uploads. The call is startForeground(SYNC, notification) with a deliberately plain "Syncing data" notification, and the manifest analysis notes there are no references to dataSync in the malware's own classes, which is what a correctly declared type should look like.
It complements FOREGROUND_SERVICE, which is the umbrella grant, and pairs with FOREGROUND_SERVICE_REMOTE_MESSAGING, which is the messaging-flavoured sibling. The write-up describes the pair as complementary: the umbrella allows persistent background tasks, and this type specifically enables continuous data transfer, making it a primary vector for exfiltrating SMS, contacts, and location to a command-and-control server while hiding behind a minimal notification.
The notification itself is the point. A generic "Syncing data" label is plausible enough to survive a glance from the victim, which is what lets the upload chain keep running.
Related: FOREGROUND_SERVICE, FOREGROUND_SERVICE_REMOTE_MESSAGING
Part of Few Android permissions I have seen used often. All permissions here were seen in the mprivhaan analysis.