LOOP / 00 / INDEXworking archive / 49 filings

Pull it apart. File the proof.

Loop is the working notebook of Mayukh Dey (MacTash). It runs one loop on repeat: understand what something is doing, preserve the evidence, and leave a cleaner path for the next pass.

A public notebook for Android malware analysis, AI security, and red teaming.

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Total filings
49
Research
05
References
43
Last filed
Oct 07, 2026

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49 records / index
Malware

Recent filings

49 of 49 records · newest first
01
Another fake NextGen mParivahan app

This one is worth mentioning because this is very funny (from my point of view), on 23rd I can across this github account:

#android#malware#mparivahan#dropper#phishing#card-fraud#firebase#device-admin#reverse-engineering
Researchdropperfiled
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03
Static analysis of rblcard.apk

RBL re-skin of the Axiscard dropper line: identical installer and manifest, rebuilt payload pointing to a new Supabase project, with live card and SMS tables proven writable.

#android#malware#rblcard#axiscard#supabase#dropper#sms-interceptor#reverse-engineering
Researchrblcardfiled
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04
Static analysis of Axiscard.apk (2)

A clean dropper (com.example.installerapp) with an unencrypted nested payload that trades Firebase for Supabase: VPN-blocking installer, SMS interception at max priority, and a PostgREST write-only exfiltration backend.

#android#malware#axiscard#dropper#supabase#sms-interceptor#reverse-engineering
Researchaxiscardfiled
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05
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

Reads the current network state and connection type. A normal permission, granted at install, that any app needing a connection legitimately requires.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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06
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

Reads WiFi status, SSID, BSSID and scan results under the pre-Android 12 model. Normal permission, granted at install.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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07
Few Android permissions I have seen used often

Index of 42 Android permission notes from the mprivhaan dropper and payload: what each one grants, how Android grants it, and what malware does with it.

#android#permissions#reference#malware#mparivahan
Referencesfiled
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08
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS

System-only authenticator role in Android's account framework, declared by mprivhaan but impossible for a sideloaded app to actually hold.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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09
BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE

Grants full screen-reading power behind one Settings switch, which mprivhaan uses as an uninstall tripwire blocking Settings, installers and four OEM security centres.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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10
BIND_VPN_SERVICE

Holds the single per-device VPN slot, which mprivhaan uses as a blackhole tunnel that discards every packet and blocks the victim's own security VPN from starting.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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11
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN

Manages Bluetooth state and discoverability under the legacy model, so Bluetooth can be toggled or made visible without any user consent.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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12
BLUETOOTH

Legacy Bluetooth access under the pre-Android 12 model. Grants pairing and discovery without the runtime prompt the modern permissions require.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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13
CALL_PHONE

Places calls with no dialer UI, which is how the implant programs unconditional call forwarding so the attacker answers the bank's verification call.

#android#permissions#reference
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14
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

Can toggle WiFi, start scans, and add networks. A normal permission, which makes it easy to overlook in an otherwise loud manifest.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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15
FLASHLIGHT

Controls the camera LED as a torch. Out of place in a fake traffic-challan app, and a useful sign of a template that requests more than it understands.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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16
FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC

Declares a foreground service as data-sync work, giving the mprivhaan payload a service that survives Doze while it uploads.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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17
FOREGROUND_SERVICE_REMOTE_MESSAGING

Declares a foreground service as messaging work, the messaging sibling of the data-sync type that carries mprivhaan's uploads.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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18
FOREGROUND_SERVICE

Lets background work run behind a persistent notification. The umbrella permission behind every polling worker in the mprivhaan payload.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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19
GET_ACCOUNTS

Enumerates the accounts registered on the device, mapping which banks and services the victim uses before anything is stolen.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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20
INSTALL_SHORTCUT

Installs a launcher shortcut. Here it pins the fake mParivahan icon so the lure survives after the dropper's own activity exits.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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21
INTERNET

Opens network connections. Normal permission granted at install, and the one capability every permission in this archive ultimately exists to serve.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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22
PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS

Reads app usage history, granted through a Settings screen rather than a prompt, so the victim sees it in Usage access instead of the permission list.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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23
POST_NOTIFICATIONS

Posts notifications. Here it is camouflage that keeps the foreground services alive, plus a second tap on the same OTP stream via the shade.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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24
READ_CALL_LOG

Returns call history, which the mprivhaan payload exfiltrates as a social graph plus timing data that becomes leverage for the next stage of social engineering.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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25
READ_CONTACTS

Returns the full contact list, which mprivhaan exfiltrates upstream as a lead list so one compromised phone can seed the next wave of smishing lures.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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26
READ_PHONE_NUMBERS

Returns the SIM's own phone numbers, which the payload pairs with device identifiers for victim fingerprinting and tracks SIM swaps so a fraud victim is not lost.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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27
READ_PHONE_STATE

Exposes device identifiers and SIM info, which the mprivhaan payload uses as the primary key for victim fingerprinting and re-registration after a SIM change.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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28
READ_SMS

Reads the whole SMS inbox on demand rather than only new arrivals, which is what makes mprivhaan's batch exfiltration path possible.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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29
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS

Reads Android's account sync configuration, which maps the victim's sync environment without touching any synced content.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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30
READ_SYNC_STATS

Exposes synchronisation history and status, the observe half of the five-permission account recon block mprivhaan declares as a group.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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31
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

Runs code at every boot. Here it is one of four registered triggers, so the implant comes back after a reboot without the victim opening it.

#android#permissions#reference
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32
RECEIVE_SMS

Delivers every incoming SMS as a live broadcast, letting the mprivhaan dropper forward sender, body and timestamp to its payload before that payload even exists.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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33
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH

System-only permission for carrier push messages, which mprivhaan pre-approves for its payload as part of whitelisting the entire messaging surface at once.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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34
REORDER_TASKS

Normal permission to change task Z-order and bring its own screens forward, which pairs with the accessibility tripwire to keep the victim out of Settings.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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35
REQUEST_COMPANION_RUN_IN_BACKGROUND

Lets a paired companion app keep running in the background, extending the companion device model into long-lived background work.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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37
REQUEST_COMPANION_USE_DATA_IN_BACKGROUND

Keeps a paired companion app using network data in the background, so the exfiltration pipe stays open when the victim is not looking.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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38
REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES

Lets an app request removal of other packages, still behind a victim confirmation, which is the uninstall half of the install chain.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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39
REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS

Asks the victim to exempt the app from Doze and App Standby, so the upload workers are not culled while they exfiltrate.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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40
REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES

Lets an app install other APKs once the victim enables Install unknown apps, which is the hinge the whole two-package dropper turns on.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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41
SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM

Fires scheduled code at precise times, behind a Settings toggle rather than a prompt, which is what makes the polling cadence reliable.

#android#permissions#reference
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42
SEND_SMS

Sends SMS silently, which turns the infected phone into a remote-controlled handset: confirming fraud, and proxying attacker messages through the victim's own number.

#android#permissions#reference
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43
UPDATE_PACKAGES_WITHOUT_USER_ACTION

Allows silent app updates with no system dialog, and the kit declares it as an upgrade on top of the install permission already there.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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44
USE_EXACT_ALARM

Same precise scheduling power as the alarm permission but reserved for eligible system-adjacent apps, which a sideloaded app cannot be.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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45
VIBRATE

Grants haptic feedback. In mprivhaan it is the phishing screens' touch, and an honest signal of which permissions the author actually reasoned about.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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46
WAKE_LOCK

Keeps the CPU awake with the screen off so background work survives, which the polling workers need to finish an upload.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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47
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS

Modifies Android's account sync settings, the write half of the five-permission account recon block the mprivhaan kit declares.

#android#permissions#reference
Referencesfiled
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48
Static analysis of mprivhaan APK

Static analysis of the mprivhaan dropper (com.airtel.android.provider.a3upjsn) and its decrypted banking payload (com.transport.gov.in): R8-obfuscated native-gated decryptor, VPN kill-switch, and phishing-to-exfil chain.

#android#malware#mparivahan#dropper#banking-trojan#reverse-engineering
Researchdropperfiled
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49
Static analysis of nextgenmparivahana APK

A deep static analysis of a fake NextGen mParivahan dropper (com.apkinstallerstable) and its encrypted banking RAT payload (com.veltrix.documents): anti-analysis tradecraft, LCG cipher, and full C2 toolkit.

#android#malware#mparivahan#dropper#banking-trojan#reverse-engineering
Researchdropperfiled
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