This one is worth mentioning because this is very funny (from my point of view), on 23rd I can across this github account:
Pull it apart. File the proof.
Loop is the working notebook of Mayukh Dey (MacTash). It runs one loop on repeat: understand what something is doing, preserve the evidence, and leave a cleaner path for the next pass.
A public notebook for Android malware analysis, AI security, and red teaming.
- Total filings
- 49
- Research
- 05
- References
- 43
- Last filed
- Oct 07, 2026
Markdown in. A navigable archive out. Every note stays editable in the repository.
Recent filings
49 of 49 records · newest firstA local static APK analysis and unpacking toolkit for observed packer, loader, and protector families.
RBL re-skin of the Axiscard dropper line: identical installer and manifest, rebuilt payload pointing to a new Supabase project, with live card and SMS tables proven writable.
A clean dropper (com.example.installerapp) with an unencrypted nested payload that trades Firebase for Supabase: VPN-blocking installer, SMS interception at max priority, and a PostgREST write-only exfiltration backend.
Reads the current network state and connection type. A normal permission, granted at install, that any app needing a connection legitimately requires.
Reads WiFi status, SSID, BSSID and scan results under the pre-Android 12 model. Normal permission, granted at install.
Index of 42 Android permission notes from the mprivhaan dropper and payload: what each one grants, how Android grants it, and what malware does with it.
System-only authenticator role in Android's account framework, declared by mprivhaan but impossible for a sideloaded app to actually hold.
Grants full screen-reading power behind one Settings switch, which mprivhaan uses as an uninstall tripwire blocking Settings, installers and four OEM security centres.
Holds the single per-device VPN slot, which mprivhaan uses as a blackhole tunnel that discards every packet and blocks the victim's own security VPN from starting.
Manages Bluetooth state and discoverability under the legacy model, so Bluetooth can be toggled or made visible without any user consent.
Legacy Bluetooth access under the pre-Android 12 model. Grants pairing and discovery without the runtime prompt the modern permissions require.
Places calls with no dialer UI, which is how the implant programs unconditional call forwarding so the attacker answers the bank's verification call.
Can toggle WiFi, start scans, and add networks. A normal permission, which makes it easy to overlook in an otherwise loud manifest.
Controls the camera LED as a torch. Out of place in a fake traffic-challan app, and a useful sign of a template that requests more than it understands.
Declares a foreground service as data-sync work, giving the mprivhaan payload a service that survives Doze while it uploads.
Declares a foreground service as messaging work, the messaging sibling of the data-sync type that carries mprivhaan's uploads.
Lets background work run behind a persistent notification. The umbrella permission behind every polling worker in the mprivhaan payload.
Enumerates the accounts registered on the device, mapping which banks and services the victim uses before anything is stolen.
Installs a launcher shortcut. Here it pins the fake mParivahan icon so the lure survives after the dropper's own activity exits.
Opens network connections. Normal permission granted at install, and the one capability every permission in this archive ultimately exists to serve.
Reads app usage history, granted through a Settings screen rather than a prompt, so the victim sees it in Usage access instead of the permission list.
Posts notifications. Here it is camouflage that keeps the foreground services alive, plus a second tap on the same OTP stream via the shade.
Returns call history, which the mprivhaan payload exfiltrates as a social graph plus timing data that becomes leverage for the next stage of social engineering.
Returns the full contact list, which mprivhaan exfiltrates upstream as a lead list so one compromised phone can seed the next wave of smishing lures.
Returns the SIM's own phone numbers, which the payload pairs with device identifiers for victim fingerprinting and tracks SIM swaps so a fraud victim is not lost.
Exposes device identifiers and SIM info, which the mprivhaan payload uses as the primary key for victim fingerprinting and re-registration after a SIM change.
Reads the whole SMS inbox on demand rather than only new arrivals, which is what makes mprivhaan's batch exfiltration path possible.
Reads Android's account sync configuration, which maps the victim's sync environment without touching any synced content.
Exposes synchronisation history and status, the observe half of the five-permission account recon block mprivhaan declares as a group.
Runs code at every boot. Here it is one of four registered triggers, so the implant comes back after a reboot without the victim opening it.
Delivers every incoming SMS as a live broadcast, letting the mprivhaan dropper forward sender, body and timestamp to its payload before that payload even exists.
System-only permission for carrier push messages, which mprivhaan pre-approves for its payload as part of whitelisting the entire messaging surface at once.
Normal permission to change task Z-order and bring its own screens forward, which pairs with the accessibility tripwire to keep the victim out of Settings.
Lets a paired companion app keep running in the background, extending the companion device model into long-lived background work.
Lets a paired companion app start foreground services while in the background, which is what lets a hidden worker become resident.
Keeps a paired companion app using network data in the background, so the exfiltration pipe stays open when the victim is not looking.
Lets an app request removal of other packages, still behind a victim confirmation, which is the uninstall half of the install chain.
Asks the victim to exempt the app from Doze and App Standby, so the upload workers are not culled while they exfiltrate.
Lets an app install other APKs once the victim enables Install unknown apps, which is the hinge the whole two-package dropper turns on.
Fires scheduled code at precise times, behind a Settings toggle rather than a prompt, which is what makes the polling cadence reliable.
Sends SMS silently, which turns the infected phone into a remote-controlled handset: confirming fraud, and proxying attacker messages through the victim's own number.
Allows silent app updates with no system dialog, and the kit declares it as an upgrade on top of the install permission already there.
Same precise scheduling power as the alarm permission but reserved for eligible system-adjacent apps, which a sideloaded app cannot be.
Grants haptic feedback. In mprivhaan it is the phishing screens' touch, and an honest signal of which permissions the author actually reasoned about.
Keeps the CPU awake with the screen off so background work survives, which the polling workers need to finish an upload.
Modifies Android's account sync settings, the write half of the five-permission account recon block the mprivhaan kit declares.
Static analysis of the mprivhaan dropper (com.airtel.android.provider.a3upjsn) and its decrypted banking payload (com.transport.gov.in): R8-obfuscated native-gated decryptor, VPN kill-switch, and phishing-to-exfil chain.
A deep static analysis of a fake NextGen mParivahan dropper (com.apkinstallerstable) and its encrypted banking RAT payload (com.veltrix.documents): anti-analysis tradecraft, LCG cipher, and full C2 toolkit.