UPDATE_PACKAGES_WITHOUT_USER_ACTION
Allows silent app updates with no system dialog, and the kit declares it as an upgrade on top of the install permission already there.
The manifest analysis calls this a highly dangerous permission precisely because of the company it keeps. UPDATE_PACKAGES_WITHOUT_USER_ACTION lets an app update packages without requiring the user to confirm through a system dialog, and it enables silent updates for third-party stores and installers by setting setRequireUserAction(USER_ACTION_NOT_REQUIRED) on the installer.
Stated on its own it sounds like a normal capability for an app updater. In this manifest it arrives directly after REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES, and the analysis is explicit that the pair is what raises the alarm: the first gets a payload onto the device with consent, and this one removes consent from the next step.
That is a genuine escalation path rather than a hypothetical one. An implant that can install a second package and then silently replace it does not need the victim again for version two. It also fits the operational picture of a kit designed for repeated deployment, where the operator can push a change to a compromised fleet without touching it.
One qualification belongs here. The permission is not something an ordinary sideloaded app holds by default, and there is no traced code-level use of it in the write-up the way there is for the SMS and contact workers. It is best read as declared intent in the manifest, sitting alongside REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES in the chain that got the payload installed in the first place.
Related: REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES
Part of Few Android permissions I have seen used often. All permissions here were seen in the mprivhaan analysis.