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POST_NOTIFICATIONS

Posts notifications. Here it is camouflage that keeps the foreground services alive, plus a second tap on the same OTP stream via the shade.

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#android#permissions#reference

Runtime prompt since Android 13. POST_NOTIFICATIONS lets an app post notifications, and the write-up singles it out as the least obviously malicious and arguably the most structural permission in the kit.

The structural role comes first. A persistent notification is what justifies the dataSync and remoteMessaging foreground services that keep the polling workers alive. Android kills background work it cannot see, so the implant wears a plausible notification as camouflage, and this permission is the thing that makes wearing one legitimate. Remove it and the FOREGROUND_SERVICE declarations lose their cover.

The second role is a redundancy play. Once notification access pairs with BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE, incoming OTP notifications can be skimmed straight from the shade without touching the SMS provider at all. That is a second, independent tap on the same OTP stream: the READ_SMS batch worker sweeps the inbox, y intercepts arrivals live, and this path reads the notification that the interception itself produced.

Read as a set, the design thesis in the manifest becomes clear: take everything the telephony stack can see, and blind everything that watches the taker. Permissions flow data upward, and the OEM security centres named in the payload's <queries> blocklist get blocked the moment the victim reaches for settings.

Related: FOREGROUND_SERVICE, FOREGROUND_SERVICE_REMOTE_MESSAGING, RECEIVE_SMS

Part of Few Android permissions I have seen used often. All permissions here were seen in the mprivhaan analysis.